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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF PowERs-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held that the judicial branch has inherent power to
determine reasonably necessary funds for its efficient and effective opera-
tion.
Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 422 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193
(1971).
The judges of the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia prepared their
budget for 1970-1971 requesting $19,706,278. They submitted this
budget to the mayor for his approval. After several meetings with the
representatives of the court, the mayor reduced the budget to
$16,488,263, and sent it to the city council. Before the city council, the
representatives of the court again argued for the inclusion of the money
deleted by the mayor.' However, the city council approved the mayor's
budget.
The judges brought a mandamus action in the common pleas court
to force the city council to appropriate and pay the additional funds.
They also petitioned the supreme court to assign a judge, other than a
Philadelphia Common Pleas Court judge, to hear the case. Due to a
conflict of interest, no judge of the common pleas court could hear the
case. The supreme court specially designated a judge of the superior
court to hear and decide the case. In a pre-trial order, the judge of the
superior court ruled that the common pleas court judges had the burden
of proving that the additional funds were reasonable and necessary. The
superior court judge compelled the payment of the additional funds,
but reduced the amount initially requested by the judges since they had
only partially met the burden.
Both parties appealed to the commonwealth court. Thereafter, a
petition was filed by the common pleas court judges, and the supreme
court assumed plenary jurisdiction.2 The superior court judge's decision
was affirmed. The supreme court reasoned that the judicial branch of
government, in order to maintain and protect its co-equal independence
1. The judges at this time also requested an additional $3,000,000 which they later
deleted.
2. The judges petitioned the supreme court to take plenary jurisdiction under PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.205 (Supp. 1971).
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with the executive and legislative branches, must possess the power to
determine the amount necessary for its efficient operation and to compel
the payment of those funds.8 As a result of this decision the judicial
branch now has broad power to prepare a budget and compel payment
of it.4
The judicial branch's attempt to protect itself began when it was
recognized that the judiciary, under a republican form of government,
would be a weak and inferior branch unless it had the ability to enforce
its demands.5 The judiciary first compelled payment of rents for rooms
for jurors.6 It then recognized that the legislature could not decrease a
judge's salary;7 that the legislature could not order a new trial; 8 that a
prothonotary must be paid for rooms rented by him in the pursuit of
his duties;9 that judges have a right to receive increases in salary; 10 and
that judges may hire stenographers," pay a handwriting expert,' 2 and
increase the salaries of court administrative personnel.13
The above decisions were based upon the judiciary's "inherent rights
and powers to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the admin-
istration of justice."' 4 In Carroll the supreme court reasoned that the
co-equal independent status of the judiciary could only be protected
from impairment or destruction if the judiciary had the inherent power
to force payment of funds which are reasonably necessary to fulfill its
mandated responsibilities.'5 The extraordinary writ of mandamus was
used to prevent the legislature from strangling the judiciary by disallow-
ing the funds which the judiciary must have to exist.' 6 The supreme
3. Of the seven judges on the supreme court, one judge took no part in the decision,
three judges wrote or agreed with concurring opinions and one judge wrote a concurring
and dissenting opinion.
4. The logical extension of this decision is that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could
compel payment of its own budget.
5. Murray, Chief Justice Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Judicial Re-
view, 32 U. Prrr. L. REv. 127 (1970).
6. Commissioners v. Hall, 7 Watts 290 (Pa. 1838).
7. Hepburn v. Mann, 5 W. & S. 403 (Pa. 1843).
8. DeChastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18 (1850).
9. McCalmont v. County of Allegheny, 29 Pa. 417 (1857).
10. Commonwealth v. Mathues, 210 Pa. 372, 59 A. 961 (1904).
11. In re Surcharge of County Commissioners, 12 Pa. D. & C. 471 (C.P. Lackawana Co.
1929).
12. Edwards v. Prutzman, 108 Pa. Super. 184, 165 A. 255 (1933).
13. Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949).
14. Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Super. 107, 14 A.2d 907 (1940).
15. The Pennsylvania Constitution enumerates the mandated responsibilities:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay.
PA. CONSr. art. 1, § 11.
16. See Hepburn v. Mann, 5 W. & S. 403, 419 (Pa. 1843) where the supreme court
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court refused to consider the financial plight of Philadelphia in deter-
mining whether the funds were reasonably necessary. The need for an
independent judiciary, which is mandated by the constitution, out-
weighed any consideration of the city's financial problems.
This problem has arisen in only a few states.' 7 The most notable case
is Carlson v. Stodola.'8 The facts and issues presented in Carlson are
strikingly similar to those of Carroll, and Carlson's ruling is identical to
Carroll's. Pennsylvania and Indiana, however, are the only states which
have taken such a broad view of the judiciary's power to protect itself.
The supreme court in Carroll misapplied the precedents relied on in
reaching its conclusion. The Pennsylvania cases relied on involved spe-
cific items necessary for the functioning of the court, whereas Carroll
involved a general appropriation. The prior cases also were limited to
the incurring of a debt in order to compel payment. 19 The very nature
of a debt implies that a contractual obligation has been incurred which
is completely absent here. This limit on tl~e power of a court to compel
payment of funds was not even considered in this decision. For addi-
tional support, Carroll relies on the position that the inherent power of
the judiciary enables a court to incur and order payment of the expenses
necessary for the proper functioning of the court.20 Again, however, this
position says nothing about the ability of a court to determine what
future funds are necessary.
The supreme court in Carroll relied heavily on Leahey v. Farrell.
2
'
In Leahey the supreme court said that if officials act unreasonably in
denying requested funds a court can mandate payment of those funds.
In applying this concept, Carroll places the burden on the court to prove
the reasonable necessity of its needs. The burden on the court in
Leahey, however, was to prove that the officials had acted arbitrarily or
capriciously in disapproving the court's request. This distinction is of
some importance if it is realized that it is easier to prove oneself has
acted in a reasonable manner, than to prove another has acted arbitrar-
recognized the potential danger of the legislative power, and that the judiciary must take
necessary steps in order to safeguard the form of government established by the constitu-
tion.
17. See generally Nobel County Council v. Fifer, 234 Ind. 172, 125 N.E.2d 709 (1955);
Schneider v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 165, 101 P. 962 (1909); Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373,
68 P. 689 (1902).
18. 247 Ind. 631, 220 N.E.2d 532 (1966).
19. See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 51-53, 274 A.2d 193, 197
(1971).
20. Gentry v. Becker, 352 Mo. 769, 174 S.W.2d 181 (1943).
21. 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949).
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ily. Also, when judging whether another's decision was reasonable it is
necessary to consider the factors deemed important by the other in
reaching his decision. Thus, the Leahey burden would have allowed for
evaluation of factors considered by the city council in disallowing the
funds, i.e., the lack of funds and the financial plight of the city. Under
the Carroll burden the supreme court refused to consider these factors.
Possibly this will force the legislature to cut its and the executive's
necessary funds in order to comply with the court's order.
The city council and mayor argued that the "reasonable necessity"
test should mean that there be an actual impairment of the judiciary's
functions and that their only obligation was to treat the court fairly.22
The supreme court rejected this limitation. Thus, there are no guide-
lines for courts to follow except what was allowed as an expense in
Carroll.
The supreme court in Carroll felt there was an undefined boundary
separating the powers of the legislature and the judiciary, and that both
branches may exercise similar powers which are within this boundary.
The separation of powers doctrine, however, recognizes certain func-
tions of each branch that cannot be exercised by the other branches.23
It has been recognized by many courts that the power to appropriate
money is exclusively a legislative function. 24 Since courts have strictly
held that the legislature has no power to order a new trial, which is ex-
clusively a judicial power 2 5 it is hard to reconcile a judicial determina-
tion that the courts may use the appropriation power which resides
rightly in the legislature. In the Pennsylvania Constitution it is stated
that, "No money shall be paid out of the treasury except upon appropri-
ations made by law, and on warrant drawn by the proper officers. n26 It is
inconsistent for the constitution to give the legislature the exclusive
right to appropriate money, and for the supreme court to say it can com-
pel the legislature to exercise that power.
The supreme court believed that the only adequate protection for a
court from the legislative ability to destroy it, by cutting off necessary
funds, was for the court to compel payment of funds. There are two
22. Interview with Matthew W. Bullock, Jr., First Deputy City Solicitor of Philadelphia,
in Philadelphia, Nov. 19, 1971.
23. See generally United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo.
35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963).
24. See generally Colbert v. State, 86 Miss. 769, 39 So. 65 (1905); Gregory v. Rollins, 230
S.C. 269, 95 S.E.2d 487 (1956).
25. DeChastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18 (1850).
26. PA. CONST. art. 3, § 24. It should be noted that there is no statute applicable to the
Carroll situation.
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ways for a court to achieve the same protection without doing violence
to the separation of powers doctrine. In Judges for the Third Judicial
Circuit v. County of Wayne 27 the Michigan Supreme Court expressed
the two ways: (1) a court can prepare and submit a budget and argue
before the executive and legislative branches that the funds are essential
for its proper functioning; and (2) if the court has failed after using the
first method it may contractually bind the legislature by incurring a
debt for a practical necessity.28
The approach in Carroll, while stressing the separation of powers doc-
trine by giving the judiciary the absolute power to establish and order
the payment of a budget, has destroyed the doctrine of checks and
balances. Now, seven judges have control over their finances which is
an exclusive legislative function. The judiciary from this decision has
the absolute freedom which potentially enables them to destroy the
republican form of government. There is no one to determine whether
the supreme court has acted arbitrarily in its appropriation. Thus,
Carroll establishes a dangerous precedent, for even though the money
forced to be appropriated may work to the advantage of the people at
this time, it leaves the door open for the judiciary to achieve a superior
position in our government. 29
Joy Flowers Conti
CRIMINAL LAW-SUBJECT-MATrER JURISDICTION-RETROACTIVITY-The
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York has held
that O'Callahan v. Parker, a decision concerning subject-matter juris-
diction, must be applied retroactively.
Flemings v. Chafee, 330 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
In 1944 Flemings was a Navy serviceman stationed in New Jersey. He
was lawfully absent from the installation, when he stole a car in Tren-
ton, and drove it to central Pennsylvania where he was apprehended by
Pennsylvania State Police. Flemings was turned over to military author-
27. 172 N.W.2d 436 (Mich. 1969).
28. Id. at 440.
29. President Washington warned of this development in talking of the doctrine of
checks and balances when he said, "[L]et there be no change by usurpation; for, though
this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which
free governments are destroyed." 12 G. WASHINGTON, WRITINGS SELECTED FROM THE ORIGINAL
MANUSCRIPTS WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR BY JERUND SPARKS, 382-398 (1848).
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